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Right or Duty: A Kantian Argument for Universal Healthcare
Joseph Crisp, D.Min.

ABSTRACT

Much of the political rhetoric about healthcare in the United States is couched in terms of
healthcare as a right or entitlement. Healthcare as a right, like all welfare rights, carries with it
the obligation to pay for it. This paper proposes that healthcare be considered, not a right, but
rather a duty within the framework of a Kantian approach to ethics. The categorical imperatives
of rational beings include the duties of self-preservation and self-development. As a precondition
for these duties, health is essentially bound up with the nature and duties of physical, rational
beings. The complexity of healthcare ensures that virtually all persons will need the services of
others, and the expense of healthcare can exceed the resources even of those who are insured.
Therefore, a just society has a moral duty to ensure access to healthcare to all of its members.
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The question of universal healthcare brings with it the question of whether all people,
simply by virtue of being human, have a right to healthcare. Human rights are widely
understood as either welfare rights or liberty rights. Welfare rights are positive rights that
require some action or expense on the part of someone to provide access to the right. Liberty
rights, by contrast, are rights that require nothing more of society or government than that it not
interfere with the exercise of the right, as, for example, the right to free speech.
The right to healthcare, if it exists, is clearly a welfare right, because simply guaranteeing
by law that no one can interfere with one’s right to healthcare does nothing to actually provide
healthcare. A right to healthcare when one has no access to healthcare is essentially a
meaningless right. Conservatives who oppose “big government” are understandably cautious
about the granting of welfare rights, because they always involve the question of who will pay
for them. I will argue in this paper that the work of the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel
Kant offers a rationale for universal healthcare not based on rights, but rather on the moral
obligation, or duty, of a society to arrange itself so that everyone has access to a reasonable level
of healthcare.
Kant’s classic work on ethics, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, attempts to
define the ethical duties of rational beings. In Kant’s philosophy, morality is derived, not from
religion or tradition, but from pure rationality; and therefore, for Kant, moral agents are rational
beings. Among the duties of such beings, Kant distinguished between those that that bind
hypothetically, and those that bind categorically. Hypothetical duties are those that are required
not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else. Categorical duties, on the other hand,
are those things that must be done, not in order to achieve or obtain something else, but for their
own sake. They are things that are done, as we would say today, because they are “the right
thing to do.” True moral duties are those that derive from categorical imperatives.
Kant stated the categorical imperative in more than one way. The two most well-known
formulations are these:
1. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should

become a universal law.
2. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.
Among the duties that are required categorically of a rational being, Kant argued, is a duty to
oneself, both to preserve one’s life and to develop one’s abilities and talents. Kant stated the
first of these duties, the duty to preserve one’s life, in relation to the question of suicide. He
asked whether a rational being, so overcome by the misfortunes of life, had a duty to continue
living, or whether he might take his own life. His answer was that an action done out of selflove that involved the destruction of the self, would be contradictory, and therefore, could not
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possibly exist as a universal law.1 He further argued that, if one “destroys himself in order to
flee from a burdensome condition, then he makes use of his person merely as a means, for the
preservation of a bearable condition up to the end of life.”2 Both formulations of the categorical
imperative, therefore, require the preservation of one’s life.
Kant further argued that the duty to oneself requires, not only the preservation of one’s life,
but also the utilization and development of one’s talents and capacities. A rational being, Kant
states, “necessarily wills that all the faculties in him should be developed because they are
serviceable and given to him for all kinds of possible aims.”3 While one might choose to neglect
one’s talents, one could not possibly will that such neglect could become a universal law of
nature, because such neglect would at the same time be in conflict with humanity’s natural
“dispositions to great perfection,”4 and would fail to further the “ends of nature” regarding the
perfection of one’s talents.
Rational beings, therefore, are morally obligated to (1) preserve themselves, and (2) develop
their abilities and talents as far as they are able. Health is the necessary precondition for the
fulfillment of both of these duties; therefore, a rational being is obligated to preserve, protect,
and care for his or her own health.
At this point, it might be objected that healthcare is a hypothetical imperative, since it serves
as a means to something else i. e., the preservation of one’s life, and the development of one’s
talents. However, in our world, rational beings are also physical beings, and our physical bodies
may be considered as integral to our being. The health of the body is so bound up with the
nature and duties of rational beings, that one might say that to preserve one’s health is also to
preserve and develop one’s being.
While Kant’s philosophy deals with the duties of autonomous rational beings, he did not
overlook the question of how such beings should live together in society. In thinking of a larger
community, Kant introduced the idea of a realm of ends. A realm of ends is a “systematic
combination of rational beings through communal objective laws.”5 Rational beings contain
each of the other’s ends within themselves—that is, each being wills for the other what it would
also will for itself, because an ethical will is universally legislative in nature.
The “communal objective laws” in the realm of ends have as their aim the reference of these
beings to one another as ends and means. Laws are designed to promote the ends of each
member of the community, and to never use them as a means to an end. Since rational beings
are categorically required to will for others what they would will for themselves, they must
necessarily will the preservation of the lives and the development of the natural faculties of
others. Since health is a precondition for doing these duties, rational beings in community must
necessarily will, and provide for, the health of others, as well as of themselves.
Kant distinguished in the realm of ends between those things which have dignity, and those
which have value, or price. “What has a price is such that something else can also be put in its
place as its equivalent; by contrast, that which is elevated above all price, and admits of no
equivalent, has a dignity.”6 Things that have value are things that can be replaced by other
things—material objects, goods, services, etc. But rational beings have dignity, not value.
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Given the unity of health and being, it can be argued that health, and its preservation, falls into
the category of those things that have dignity rather than value, and are beyond all price.
Since health has dignity, rather than value, it cannot be treated as a market good. It has no
equivalent. One might choose to buy an I-Phone, rather than a television set, or one might
choose to buy neither. But one has no choice but to fix a broken arm, or to undergo treatment for
a life-threatening disease. One cannot choose to buy a new car instead.
It might be argued that healthcare is the responsibility of each person, not the responsibility
of the society. It is certainly true that each individual has an obligation to maintain his or her
health. However, in spite of one’s best efforts to maintain one’s health, everyone can be subject
to illness or injury requiring a level of care which he or she cannot provide for him or herself,
because they lack the knowledge and skill, and, if they are sick, they lack the ability. They will
necessarily require the services of some other person who has knowledge, skill, and sufficient
health to provide for another. Therefore, they must have access to the knowledge, skills, and
ability of another, which requires that someone be available, and that someone pay for it.
It might be argued at this point that everyone should be responsible to pay for their own
healthcare, just as they would pay for any market good. However, as noted above, healthcare in
not a market good like others, subject to the normal laws of supply and demand. Further,
healthcare has become so complex and expensive that many people, and not just the poor, can be
excluded. Many lack health insurance, and some are underinsured. Almost anyone could be
vulnerable to a healthcare crisis that could drain all their resources. In this sense, we are all
behind what John Rawls called the “veil of ignorance,”7 in that no one can know when or if they
will be confronted by a healthcare crisis that exceeds their ability to pay. Here one thinks of
Kant’s example of a person who, endowed with prosperity, chooses not to contribute toward the
needs of others less fortunate. While a society might subsist under such a principle, one could
not possibly will that it could be a universal law, “for the case could sometime arise in which he
needs the love and sympathetic participation of others, and where, through such a natural law
arising from his own will, he would rob himself of all the hope of assistance that he wishes for
himself.”8
If healthcare is understood as an obligation so closely tied to the duties to preserve one’s life
and develop one’s ability that it is in fact itself a categorical duty, and if in the realm of ends,
every being necessarily wills that which is universally legislative, i. e., that which every other
being would will for itself, then it follows that, members of a just society will seek to ensure that
everyone has access to a sufficient level of healthcare to preserve their life and fulfill their
greatest potential.
The object of this paper has been to establish the moral obligation of a society to provide
access to healthcare for all its members. Healthcare is not a right or an entitlement, but a moral
duty that touches all members of society. It might be accomplished through a universal single
payer system like Medicare, or it might be accomplished through some combination of
government programs and market based approaches. By however means, Kant’s approach to
ethics can be said to require that a just society develop a system of universal healthcare that is
accessible to all of its members.
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